The Future of Class Actions in the Wake of \u3ci\u3e Comcast v. Behrend \u3c/i\u3e by Toal, Megan
Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 3 Article 6
2014
The Future of Class Actions in the Wake of Comcast
v. Behrend
Megan Toal
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law
Review by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Megan Toal The Future of Class Actions in the Wake of Comcast v. Behrend , 26 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 545 (2014).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol26/iss3/6
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 106 Side A      06/02/2014   15:10:17
35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 106 Side A      06/02/2014   15:10:17
C M
Y K
Toal Article2.docx (Do Not Delete)  5/21/2014 2:44 PM 
 
545 
THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTIONS IN 
THE WAKE OF COMCAST V. BEHREND 
Megan Toal* 
INTRODUCTION 
lass actions are a unique category of litigation; these types of 
cases are an exception to the rule that only named parties are 
subject to a disputed matter.1 In 2013, the Supreme Court of the 
United States heard many class action suits, often disputes re-
garding certification of the class itself.2 On March 27, 2013, the 
Supreme Court decided the antitrust class action suit Comcast v. 
Behrend.3 The central issue in Comcast involved the correct in-
terpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.4 This particu-
lar rule was designed to “promote judicial economy” through the 
use of litigation of multiple plaintiffs who possess common ques-
tions of fact and law.5 Because class actions are a different type of 
                                                          
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. 
 1  Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–03 (1979)) (noting “[t]he class-action device was 
designed as ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and 
on behalf of the individual named parties only.’”). 
 2  Lawrence Hurley, Analysis: Big business the winner in U.S. Supreme 
Court class action cases, REUTERS (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/21/us-usa-court-classaction-
idUSBRE95K01U20130621, (detailing briefly the big class action disputes that 
the U.S. Supreme Court heard this past term, specifically the seven class ac-
tions that reached the Court which include: Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Re-
tirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct 1184 (2013), Standard Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct 1345 (2013), Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. 
Symczyk, 133 S. Ct 1523 (2013), Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct 
2064 (2013), Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct 2191 (2013) and American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct  2304 (2013)). 
 3  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
 4  FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 5  Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160; See also Califano, 442 U.S. at 700 (holding that 
“the class action device saves the resources of both the courts and the parties 
by permitting an issue . . . to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 
23). 
C 
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litigation, it is repeatedly noted that the evidence necessary to sat-
isfy the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification requires a 
“rigorous analysis,” and thus the Court explored what this analy-
sis entails.6 
Class actions at the Supreme Court level, including Com-
cast, often lead to strong and heated divisions on the bench. The 
majority opinions [of the current Supreme Court] have generally 
sided with the defendants, which are often large corporations. As 
a result, many commentators classify the current Court as pro-
business and consequently question the future of class actions.7 
Some scholars argue that the class action lawsuit is simply pro-
gressing and adapting over time.8 From the inception of the cur-
rent Rule 23 in 1966, there have been various phases of interpre-
tation.9 While the rule had in its foundation the goal for judicial 
efficiency, in the early years that was simply not the case.10 Spe-
cifically, courts were faced with difficulties in assessing how best 
to manage these types of cases, especially when determining inju-
ry, causation, and damages.11 During the first few decades, the 
Court focused on trying common issues and saving individual is-
sues for later, which often led to an increased number of settle-
                                                          
 6  Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160; See D. Matthew Allen & Amanda Arnold San-
sone, The ‘Rigorous Analysis’ Overlay on Current Class Action Jurisprudence, 
BLOOMBERG LAW, available at http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-
contributions/the-rigorous-analysis-overlay-on-current-class-action-
jurisprudence/, (describing the evolution of the rigorous analysis since the Rule 
23 in current form was adopted in 1966). 
 7  Hurley, supra note 2. 
 8  Allen, supra note 6; See also John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action 
Rule 23-What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 328 (2005) (noting 
the evolution of class action and attributing it to the high monetary stakes now 
attached to these types of claims, especially in the products liability and mass 
tort fields). 
 9  Allen, supra note 6 (describing the various stages of interpretation in 
how Rule 23 applies to the certification of class actions); See Robert Bone, The 
Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2297474 [hereinafter Bone, Misguided] 
(explaining the evolution of courts’ interpretations of Rule 23 since the modern 
inception of the rule in 1966). 
 10  Allen, supra note 6; See Robert Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certifica-
tion and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L. J. 1251, 1260 [hereinafter Bone, 
Class] (noting that one of the many goals the drafters had in mind when refor-
mulating Rule 23 was judicial efficiency, but that this goal concerned many 
people in the business, securities and environmental fields who believed that 
they would become targets for enormous amounts of litigation). 
 11 Allen, supra note 6. 
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2014 The Future of Class Actions 547 
ments.12 
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court heard General 
Telephone Company of Southwest v. Falcon, which was instru-
mental in the development of class action lawsuits. This case set 
forth the standard of “rigorous analysis” that lower courts must 
employ in order to properly certify classes under Rule 23.13 This 
standard of a “rigorous analysis” led the Court to become even 
more selective and skeptical when certifying large diverse clas-
ses.14 From the 1980s through 1995, despite the courts use of the 
“rigorous analysis” standard, class certifications were easier to 
come by for plaintiffs.15 Even more importantly—in the context 
of Comcast—was the deference given to expert testimony.16 The 
certification of the class at the district court level had great im-
portance because until 1998, a class certification was unchangea-
ble, as there was no vehicle for a party to appeal.17 However, 
courts began to shift in their perception of class actions in 1995, 
when appellate courts started decertifying classes.18 Two years 
later, the Supreme Court began issuing opinions that would de-
certify major class actions suits.19 Courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have since taken the rule set forth in Falcon as a strict re-
quirement.20 Additionally, due to the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, these types of cases increasingly reached the Supreme Court 
and thus the process for analyzing class certification became more 
defined.21 
                                                          
 12  Id.; See also Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. 
U.  L. REV. 729, 737 (2013) [hereinafter Klonoff, Decline] (explaining that very 
few class actions actually went to trial, but instead involved high monetary set-
tlements). 
 13  Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147. 
 14  Allen, supra note 6. 
 15  Id.; See Klonoff, Decline supra note 12, at 737 (suggesting that in the 
1980s class actions were easier to come by for plaintiffs). 
 16  Allen, supra note 6; But cf. 1 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:14 
n. 18 (9th ed.) (quoting In re Potash Antitrust Litigation, 159 F.R.D. 682, 687 
(D. Minn. 1995)) (holding that “[i]n assessing whether to certify a class, the 
Court’s inquiry is limited to whether or not the proposed methods are so in-
substantial as to amount to no method at all”). 
 17  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 18  Allen, supra note 6. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  See generally Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §1453 (2011) (provid-
ing avenues for class action disputes so that they may be removed from state 
court to federal district courts); See John Campbell, Unprotected Class: Five 
Decisions, Five Justices, and Wholesale Change to Class Action Law, 13 WYO. 
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The Court no longer examined Rule 23 as a pleading 
standard, and although courts previously did not delve into the 
merits of the case, it soon became a necessary step in determining 
whether certification was proper.22 More importantly, recently 
and in large part due to the influential case of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
the requirement for commonality became more structured.23 As 
often mentioned in dissenting opinions, plaintiff potential classes 
have historically satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) quite 
easily.24 Rule 23(a) required that plaintiffs only had to possess one 
common question or one common point of unification in order to 
meet this requirement.25 However, the shift from common ques-
tions to common answers, which became a large point of conten-
tion for the Court in addressing Comcast, had begun. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth 
the requirements for a class action suit.26 Plaintiffs must satisfy 
the requirements of Rule 23(a) as well as satisfy at least one sub-
section of Rule 23(b). Typically, fulfilling the prerequisites of Rule 
                                                          
L. REV. 463, 466–67 (noting four important consequences of CAFA, (1) broad-
ened the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction to include more class action dis-
putes, (2) authorized the removal from state courts, (3) altered the procedure 
for class actions, and (4) created regulation for settlement and minimized dis-
parate treatments for diverse class members). 
 22  Allen, supra note 6; See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 
2551–52 (2011) (explaining that it is necessary to examine merits in order to 
make a proper determination on preliminary matters, including class certifica-
tion). 
 23  Allen, supra note 6; See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555 (stating that 
“[m]erely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion has produced an over-
all sex-based disparity does not suffice” to meet the requirement of commonali-
ty); See also Bone, Misguided supra note 9 (stating, “[t]he Wal-Mart Court 
made (a)(2) into something stricter.  After Wal-Mart, a common question alone 
is not enough; the common question must lie at the core of all the claims.”). 
 24  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ((citing Moore’s 
Federal Practice § 23.23[2] (3d Ed. 2011)); See also Jenkins v. Raymark Indus-
tries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (1986) (noting that under Rule 23(a), “[t]he thresh-
old of ‘commonality’ is not high.”). 
 25  Allen, supra note 6; but cf. A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Height-
ened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 471 
(2013) (stating that recently, what matters at the class certification stage is not 
common questions, but rather common answers). 
 26  FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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23(a) is a simpler standard for plaintiffs to meet.27 Prior to 2011, 
virtually every potential class met the requirements of Rule 
23(a).28 Because the parties in Comcast did not dispute whether 
Rule 23(a) was satisfied, the courts’ analysis consisted of a discus-
sion of Rule 23(b).  Historically, 23(b) imposes a slightly stricter 
burden for the plaintiffs to meet in order for proper class certifi-
cation.29 This subsection denotes the types of class actions that 
may be maintained provided that subsection (a) has been satis-
fied.30 Rule 23(b)(1) states that a class may be certified if dividing 
the class into individuals or smaller sub-classes would create a 
risk of either (1) inconsistent rulings for each of the members or 
(2) as a practical matter adjudicating individual matters would be 
dispositive to the other members’ interests or prevent the other 
members from properly protecting their interests.31 Similarly, 
Rule 23(b)(2) holds that the class may be certified if the defendant 
acts or fails to act on grounds applicable to the whole class, where 
final injunctive or declaratory relief is necessary for the all class 
members.32 The most relevant subsection for this Note, however, 
is Rule 23(b)(3) because it was the point of controversy for the 
Court in Comcast.33 Rule 23(b)(3) is often referred to as the pre-
dominance requirement since it requires that questions of law or 
fact relevant to the class predominate over questions that are 
common to individual members.34 
                                                          
 27  See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.591, 624 (holding 
“[e]ven if Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement may be satisfied by that shared 
experience, the predominance criterion is far more demanding.”). 
 28  Robert Klonoff, Reflections on the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 533, 536 (2012) [hereinafter Klonoff, Reflections]. 
 29  Bone, Misguided supra note 9, at 55; See also Rule 23. Class Actions, 1 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary Rule 23 (noting that 
commonality historically was often easily met, and that Rule 23(b) acted more 
like a gatekeeper to keep unnecessary suits from progressing forward). 
 30  1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:27 (5th ed.) (explaining that all re-
quirements set forth in 23(a) must be satisfied, as well as one of the four sub-
sections of 23(b)).  As the author addresses it is important to note, while 23(b) 
has three subsections 23(b)(1) has two distinct parts. Id. at n. 1. 
 31  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). 
 32  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 33  Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 1433–35. 
 34  FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) which states that, 
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . . the court 
finds that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is su-
perior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class 
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The main issue in Comcast was an allegation of a breach 
of the Sherman Act, which was designed to protect trade and 
commerce, and make trusts that would restrict trade or commerce 
in any way illegal.35 Often in an antitrust class action case, before 
the merits of the claim can be explored the question of certifica-
tion must be settled.36  Rule 23(b)(3) dictates that a class action 
must be the most effective method of litigation in adjudicating 
the dispute.37 However, if the defendant(s) are successful, the like-
lihood that individual class members will pursue smaller or indi-
vidual actions against the company or corporation in an antitrust 
suit is minimal.38 
Historically, there was a liberal approach with respect to 
certifying antitrust class actions, in large part because class ac-
tions were the best way to treat these types of disputes.39 Howev-
er, the treatment of expert testimony in antitrust class actions has 
differed, with some courts applying a minimal level of scrutiny to 
expert testimony prior to certification.40 This sentiment of mini-
                                                          
members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or un-
desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; 
and the likely difficulties in managing class action. 
 35  See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (stating “[e]very contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.”). 
 36  Rabiej, supra note 8, at 328. 
 37 Bone, supra note 9, at 1260 (suggesting that the 1966 drafters of Rule 23 
intended subsection (b)(3) to “further the twin policies of efficiency and sub-
stantive norm enforcement.”). 
 38  See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 
2004) (Posner, J.) (acknowledging that “[t]he realistic alternative to a class ac-
tion is not seventeen million individual suits, but zero individual suits”  and 
this is because of the likely cost to individual plaintiffs to litigate against large 
corporate defendants). 
 39  See In re Am. Exp. Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 2012) 
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (U.S. 2012) and rev’d sub nom. Am. Exp. Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (U.S. 2013) (holding that the court is “per-
suaded by the record before us that if plaintiffs cannot pursue their allegations 
of antitrust law violations as a class, it is financially impossible for the plain-
tiffs to seek to vindicate their federal statutory rights.”). 
 40  Robert H. Klonoff, Antitrust Class Actions: Chaos in the Courts, 11 
Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 14 (2005) [Hereinafter Klonoff, Antitrust] (citing to In 
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation 200 F.R.D 326, 348 (E.D. Mich. 2001)); 
See also In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp. 1019, 1042 (N.D. Miss. 
1993) (holding that “[t] he court’s role at the class certification stage in as-
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mal scrutiny, however, was not applied by all courts or in all cas-
es; additional scrutiny placed on expert witnesses is apparent in 
Weisfeld v. Sun Chemical Corp., where the court addressed the 
fact that the expert did not provide support for his conclusions.41 
As a result, the court expressed concerns that there would not be 
adequate proof to demonstrate that the injury and damages were 
on a class-wide basis.42 
The idea of “rigorous scrutiny” evolved from Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.43 While the case did not coin 
this term, there was an instructive discussion on the scrutiny that 
must be completed with respect to expert testimony.44 Historical-
ly, circuit courts were divided on whether or not and to what ex-
tent Daubert applies to class actions.45 There was some specula-
tion that Comcast v. Behrend would clarify any confusion, 
however this was not the case. 
II.  DISCUSSION - COMCAST V. BEHREND 
Comcast Corp v. Behrend, which alleged violations of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, first went to trial in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania.46 Following the decision in In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litigation—which held that simply because the certifi-
cation requirements and the merits of a claim overlap that does 
not excuse a thorough inquiry into ensuring the prerequisites are 
                                                          
sessing the proposed methods of proving damages is quite limited. The prelim-
inary inquiry is whether or not the proposed methods are so insubstantial that 
they amount to no method at all.”); but see In re Visa Check/MasterMoney An-
titrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (noting however, that the district court must 
determine that the expert testimony is not so unreliable that it would be inad-
missible as a matter of law). 
 41  Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 84 F. App’x 257, 261–62 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 42  Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 144 (D.N.J 2002). 
 43  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). 
 44  Daubert, 133 S. Ct. at 2792.  This case established the standard for ex-
pert testimony, specifically stating that at the trial level the judge must deter-
mine “that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is rel-
evant to the task at hand.” Id. 
 45  Meredith M. Price, The Proper Application of Daubert to Expert Testi-
mony in Class Certification, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1349, 1356 (2012) 
(stating, “the debate between the Seventh and Eighth Circuits centers on 
whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert . . . is applicable at the point 
of class certification or instead limited to a full application during the merit 
portion of a trial.”). 
 46  Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 153 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
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met—the court granted Comcast’s motion to reconsider whether 
certification of the class of plaintiffs was proper.47 The plaintiffs 
put forth four theories of antitrust behavior and while the court 
affirmed the certification of the class, it only accepted one of the 
theories.48 The court held the theory that Comcast exhibited 
overbuilding behavior, which deterred other competitors from 
entering the market, was sufficient to support class certification.49 
In Comcast, the potential class sought certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3), which states that certification is proper if the ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class predominate over any is-
sues relating to the individual members of the class.50 Rule 
23(b)(3) goes on to require that litigating as a class action must be 
the best and most effective way to adjudicate the controversy at 
hand.51 
The trial court is tasked with performing a “rigorous anal-
ysis” of potential class actions when determining if certification is 
proper.52 The Hydrogen Peroxide ruling clarified the definition of 
“rigorous analysis” because it specifically requires trial courts to 
complete a deep analysis of all factual and legal issues that are 
relevant to Rule 23.53 The court need not delve into the full merits 
                                                          
 47  Id. 
 48  Id. The four theories included: (1) Comcast’s swaps and transactions in 
the Philadelphia market eliminated competition and as a result, customers ex-
perienced increased prices; (2) the fact that Comcast clustered the Philadelphia 
market led to higher rates for basic cable; (3) it was profitable for Comcast to 
deny access to regional sports channels which in turn increased the prices of 
basic cable subscribers; and (4) Comcast’s clustering prevented over builders 
from entered the Philadelphia market, which resulted in higher rates paid by 
class members; See also Mark Moller, Common Problems for the Common 
Answer Test: Class Certification in Amgen and Comcast, (October 24, 2013) 
2013 Cato Supreme Court Review 301, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2344877 (explaining “‘clustering’ is antitrust lingo for 
a company’s efforts to concentrate its operations in a particular market, and 
Comcast pursued such a strategy in the Philadelphia are through a series of 
acquisitions approved by antitrust regulators.”). 
 49  See Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 153. 
 50  Id. at 154. 
 51  Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 154; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 52  Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 154; See 5 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s 
Federal Practice § 23.61 [1] (3d ed. 2008) (stating “[p]leading requirements are 
distinct from the requirements for certifying a case as a class action. A court 
may not and should not certify a class action without a rigorous examination of 
the facts to determine if the certification requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) 
have been met.”). 
 53  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 (3d. Cir. 
2008). 
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of the case at the certification stage, but may need to hear expert 
testimony with respect to the prerequisites of Rule 23.54 The dis-
trict court, under Rule 23(b), has the burden of considering 
whether the plaintiff’s legal claim may be proven with evidence 
at trial that is related to all the class members.55 In order to suc-
ceed on an antitrust allegation, the plaintiffs must prove three es-
sential elements: (1) a violation of section one of the Sherman An-
titrust Act; (2) individual injury or impact resulting from the 
violation; and (3) measurable damages.56 Moreover, the plaintiffs 
must prove that evidence common to the class will predominate 
for each of the elements.57 At the certification stage, the plaintiffs 
need not prove the merits or the effects of antitrust behavior but 
must show that each element of an antitrust claim may be proven 
at trial by evidence that is common to the class.58 
The plaintiffs believed they could offer evidence through 
their damage expert, Dr. McClave, and his model, which de-
scribed the extent of damages Comcast owed to the class.59 Dr. 
McClave approximated these figures under the assumption that 
                                                          
 54  Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 155; See also 5 Moore’s Federal Practice § 
23.46[4] (stating “because the determination of a certification request invaria-
bly involves some examination of factual and legal issues underlying the plain-
tiffs’ cause of action, a court may consider the substantive elements of the 
plaintiffs’ case in order to envision the form that a trial on those issues would 
take.”). 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. at 156 (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d. at 311). 
 57  Id. (quoting Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 141 (D.N.J. 
2002)); See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977) (ex-
plaining that every single class member must prove at least some degree of im-
pact from the alleged antitrust violation). 
 58  Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 156; See In re New Motor Motor Vehicles Ca-
nadian Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding “[i]n anti-
trust class actions, common issues do not predominate if the fact of antitrust 
violation and the fact of antitrust impact cannot be established through com-
mon proof.”). 
 59  Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 156; See also In re Ethylene Propylene Diene 
Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 256 F.R.D. 82, 95 (D. Conn. 2009) (discuss-
ing the use of a regression model to provide evidence of predominance, specifi-
cally noting that “[i]n an antitrust suit, plaintiffs will generally use multiple re-
gression analysis to demonstrate that a ‘conspiracy’ variable has influence 
over the dependent variable (price)-that is, class members paid a higher price 
than the basic economic principles of supply and demand would otherwise dic-
tate, thus demonstrating collusive behavior was at work.”); See also Behrend,  
264 F.R.D. at 169 n. 24 (explaining that “it is undisputed by the experts that 
multiple regression analysis is an acceptable and widely recognized statistical 
tool for measuring antitrust impact.”). 
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all four theories of liability would prevail.60 The court held that 
the class could demonstrate a common damage methodology, so it 
did not matter that the damage model reflected all four theories 
of antitrust behavior rather than solely the accepted over builder 
theory, and thus the class was certified.61 
After the unfavorable decision, Comcast appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third District.62 The court 
of appeals ruled that an attack on the methodology is irrelevant 
in an inquiry of class certification.63 At this stage, the court stated 
that the plaintiffs need not tie each theory with a precise number 
of damages but merely must show that damages could be accu-
rately calculated.64 The court held that the district court exam-
ined the evidence submitted on both sides, which included meth-
odology, conclusions, and present criticisms.65 The court 
determined that the model was still workable despite the use of 
all four theories of antitrust conduct in its calculations.66 The 
court emphasized that at the class certification stage the district 
court simply must determine whether plaintiffs have demonstrat-
ed through a preponderance of evidence that damages may be as-
sessed through common proof.67 Class certification will not be de-
feated simply because the calculations may not be exact.68 
While the court affirmed the lower court’s decision, Judge 
Jordan put forth a strong dissent.69 The Judge adamantly argued 
that the district court used too much discretion in determining 
                                                          
 60  Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 162. 
 61  Id. at 191. 
 62  Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. granted in 
part, 133 S. Ct. 24, 183 L. Ed. 2d 673 (U.S. 2012) and rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 185 
L. Ed. 2d 515 (U.S. 2013). 
 63  Behrend, 655 F. 3d at 207. 
 64  Id.; See 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 3:14 (9th ed.) (explaining that 
the court emphasized that the district court should determine whether the ex-
pert’s model can evolve into admissible evidence, not necessarily whether the 
evidence offered is perfect at the certification stage). 
 65  Behrend, 655 F. 3d at 200. 
 66  Id.; See Campbell, supra note 21, at 476 (describing that the court found 
that the expert did not have to perform all the different potential calculations, 
but rather it was sufficient that there simply was a method and a formula that 
could be used to calculate should the case proceed to trial). 
 67  Behrend, 655 F.3d at 204. 
 68  Id. (quoting In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust 
Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 26 (1st Cir. 2008) (“We are looking here not for hard factual 
proof, but for a more thorough explanation of how the pivotal evidence behind 
plaintiff’s theory can be established.”). 
 69  Behrend, 655 F.3d at 208 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
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that certification of the class was proper, holding that the model 
failed to demonstrate that common evidence was available to es-
timate damages applicable to the entire class.70 He suggested re-
manding the case in order to determine whether the class needed 
to be divided into subclasses to make damages more ascertaina-
ble.71 
He further emphasized that the model was irrelevant be-
cause it did not solely examine the accepted theory of anticompet-
itive overbuilding.72 In order to remedy this discrepancy, Judge 
Jordan argued that the court should vacate and require the plain-
tiffs to adjust the model to reflect only the overbuilding theory, 
which later became an issue for the majority once the case 
reached the Supreme Court.73 Judge Jordan emphasized that the 
overbuilding theory would only impact the counties in which 
RCN was licensed to overbuild, which in fact were only five of 
the nineteen counties.74 This further demonstrated, in Judge Jor-
dan’s mind, that certification of the entire class was improper.75 
A. The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion  
In the majority’s discussion, Judge Jordan’s dissent played 
an important role once Comcast brought its case before the Su-
preme Court of the United States.76 The Court attempted to an-
swer one important question: whether class certification is proper 
if the evidence provided is not clearly admissible.77 The court 
                                                          
 70  Id. at 210 (Jordan, J., dissenting); See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Anti-
trust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311–12 (3d. Cir. 2008) (noting the question of pre-
dominance revolves around whether the plaintiffs can prove that antitrust im-
pact is capable at proof at trial which is common to the class, as opposed to the 
individual). Judge Jordan asserts that the majority abused its discretion in 
finding that this is possible.  See also Messner v. Northshore University 
HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 823 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that it would be an 
“appropriate and limited use of merits evidence at the certification stage” for 
defendants “to argue that [an expert’s] methodologies were flawed.”). 
 71  Behrend, 655 F.3d at 211 (Jordan J., dissenting). 
 72  Id. at 225 (Jordan, J., dissenting); Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–35. 
 73  Behrend, 655 F. 3d at 216 (Jordan, J., dissenting). Judge Jordan held 
that the model did not meet the one of the three requirements imposed by Rule 
702 and Daubert, specifically arguing that the testimony and facts were not 
adequately tied together. 
 74  Id. at 213. 
 75  Id. at 225 (Jordan J. dissenting). 
 76  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434 (citing Behrend, 655 F. 3d at 216). 
 77  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426. The court stated that the issue is “whether a 
district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff 
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voted in favor for Comcast, in a 5-4 decision, with Justice Scalia 
writing the majority opinion.78 
The Court emphasized that because the model focused on 
the plaintiffs’ original argument, which included all four theories 
of antitrust behaviors exhibited by Comcast, and failed to 
acknowledge the solely accepted theory, class certification was 
improper.79 While the court of appeals affirmed the district 
court’s holding, the Supreme Court disagreed, given that the 
model’s methodology could be used to show that the damages 
were capable of measurement.80 The majority held that the court 
of appeals disregarded precedent that dictates a thorough analy-
sis of whether common issues predominate over individual is-
sues.81 Because the lower courts saw no purpose in tying the ac-
cepted theory of antitrust behavior to the damage model, they did 
not meet the required standard.82 Moreover, without matching 
theories of liability to damage calculation, the court of appeals set 
the bar for appropriate methodology quite low.83 
Thus, the majority found the plaintiff’s evidence model 
lacking, and held the evidence was insufficient to show predomi-
nance of issues.84 The Court emphasized that because the model 
focused on the plaintiffs’ original argument, which included all 
four theories of antitrust behaviors exhibited by Comcast, and 
failed to acknowledge the one accepted theory, class certification 
was improper.85 
The Court relied, at least in part, on a Daubert analysis.86 
                                                          
class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show 
the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.”  Id. 
 78  Id. at 1432–35. 
 79  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433; See Federal Judicial Center, Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence 432 (3d ed. 2011) (stating that “[t]he first step in 
a damages study is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into 
an analysis of the economic impact of that event.”). 
 80  Comcast. 133 S. Ct. at 1431. 
 81  Id. at 1433 (stating that “by refusing to entertain certain arguments 
against respondents damages model . . . simply because those arguments would 
also be pertinent to the merits determination, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of 
precedents requiring precisely that inquiry.”). 
 82  Id. 
 83  See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433 (stating “under that logic [by refusing to 
delve in the merits of the case], at the class certification stage any method of 
measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide, no matter 
how arbitrary the measurements may be.”). 
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Sergio Campos, Opinion Analysis: No Common Ground, SCOTUS 
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The majority only mentioned this briefly because Comcast did 
not challenge the admissibility of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony 
in district court.87 Because it was not fully addressed by the 
Court, it is unclear specifically to what extent a Daubert analysis 
is necessary at the class certification stage.88 
At the heart of this case is the debate over whether a class 
must simply have “common questions” or must also have “com-
mon answers.”89 The Court found that there has to be a common 
answer to the issue of damages in a class action suit, and because 
the plaintiffs failed to provide this, the class cannot and should 
not have been certified by the lower courts.90 The Court held that 
the questions relating to individual damage calculations will 
outweigh the questions relevant to the class.91 Thus, the majority 
held that in order for a class to be certified there must not only be 
common questions, but there must also be common answers. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Minority Opinion  
The majority opinion prompted a strong dissent by Justic-
es Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan who disagreed on 
both procedural and substantive grounds.92 First and foremost, 
the dissent stated that given the reformulation of the original 
                                                          
BLOG (March 29, 2013) available at: 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/opinion-analysis-no-common-ground/; See 
generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (establish-
ing how expert testimony must be examined by the court). 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id.; See Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, Business Roundtable, and the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Comcast, 133 
S. Ct. 1426 (noting that if a trial court certifies based on expert testimony that 
would not withstand a Daubert analysis then the court skirts its gatekeeping 
responsibility and allows certification that does not meet the prerequisites set 
forth in Rule 23). 
 89  Allan Dinkoff, Comcast v. Behrend’ Bigger Than We Thought at First 
Blush? N.Y.L.J., April 5, 2013, available at 
http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=11819; See also Richard Na-
gareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 
131–32 (2009) (suggesting that “[w]hat matters to class certification. . .is not the 
raising of common questions . . .but, rather the capacity of a class-wide pro-
ceeding to generate commons answers apt to drive the resolution of litiga-
tion.”). 
 90  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433–35. 
 91  Id. at 1430; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 92  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435 (Ginsburg J., & Breyer J., dissenting). 
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question, the petition for certiorari should not have been granted. 
Instead of hearing and discussing the District Court’s Rule 
23(b)(3) analysis and determining error as originally anticipated, 
the question shifted into a debate on the admissibility of expert 
testimony.93 Therefore, the parties prepared to argue their point 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and a Daubert analy-
sis.94 However, as the dissent pointed out, Comcast must have ob-
jected to the expert evidence in a timely matter in order for the 
claim to be preserved.95  Because Comcast made no objection, it 
forfeited its right to object to the model at the class certification 
stage.96 Thus, the dissent argued that because Comcast forfeited 
its right, the writ of certiorari was carelessly granted.97 
Additionally, the dissent addressed the issue of judicial ef-
ficiency.98 They emphasized that when aggregating the plaintiffs 
and determining liability common to the class, predominance is 
often satisfied, in large part, because it saves time and expense.99 
Further, the dissent cited Butler v. Sears Roebuck & Company, 
which held that certification is proper for classes because of effi-
ciency and specifically that predominance is an issue of efficien-
cy.100 That case established that no bar exists on class certification 
                                                          
 93  Id.; See also Campos, supra note 86 (noting “[t]he Court granted certio-
rari, but reformulated the question presented as one concerning whether the 
expert’s model had to be admissible under Daubert for class certification pur-
poses.  Consequently, the justices during oral argument focused on what 
standard of admissibility, if any, should apply to evidence like the expert’s 
model offered to show a predominance of common issues.”). 
 94  Comcast 131 S. Ct. at 1435. 
 95   Id.; See also FED. R. EVID. 103 (setting forth the requirements for 
claiming an error in evidence in order to exclude evidence). 
 96  Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 1436 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting); but 
see Brief for Petitioners at 4, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (stating that Comcast 
did preserve its objection by objecting to the use of the model at class certifica-
tion, and did not also need to separately object to the admission of the expert’s 
opinions at the evidentiary hearing). 
 97  Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 1436 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 98  Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing to 7AAC. 
Wright A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778, 121 (3d 
ed. 2005)); See Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 471 (explaining that the class action device 
is necessary for permitting issues affecting many parties to be litigated in a 
managed, expedited and efficient way). 
 99  Wight A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778 
121(3d ed. 2005). 
 100  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1437; See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 
F.3d 359, 662 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2768, 
186 L. Ed. 2d 215 (U.S. 2013) and judgment reinstated, 11-8029, 2013 WL 
4478200 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2013) (stating “predominance is a question of effi-
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simply because every plaintiff did not suffer from the exact same 
issues.101 
The dissent emphasized that the main issue is an antitrust 
injury, specifically that the injury must be the type that existing 
antitrust laws were designed to prevent.102 The respondents at-
tempted to prove a violation by noting that Comcast had taken 
control of over 60% of the Philadelphia market.103 This was im-
portant for the dissenting opinion, as it noted that the govern-
ment typically finds any one firm or company owning over 25% 
of the market problematic.104 It was the responsibility of the class 
to prove that not only did Comcast have monopoly power, but al-
so that it used that power to charge the plaintiffs higher prices.105 
The class attempted to demonstrate that Comcast asserted 
its monopoly power through the regression analysis offered by 
their expert, Dr. McClave.106 The regression analysis in the model 
compares the counties included in the class to the counties outside 
the class, where the alleged anticompetitive conduct was not 
practiced.107 The model concluded that because of Comcast’s al-
                                                          
ciency . . .  Is it more efficient, in terms both of economy of judicial resources 
and of the expense of litigation to the parties, to decide some issues on a class 
basis or all issues in separate trials?”). 
 101  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1438 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 102 Id.; See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 
334(1990) (quoting Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat., 429 U.S. 477, 489 
(1977) (noting that a plaintiff cannot recover under the Clayton Act simply be-
cause there may exist a casual link between injury and an illegal presence on 
the market, but rather that the injury has to flow from an illegal activity that 
existing antitrust laws aim to prevent). 
 103  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1438 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 104 Id. (citing to Dept. of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines § 5.3, 19 (2010)) (explaining how firms that own that large 
of a portion of the market gain the ability to charge or raise prices above the 
typical competitive levels, thus harming consumers). 
 105  Id.; See, e.g., Ethylene Propylene, 256 F.R.D. at 88 (offering an expla-
nation of how regression models may be used to prove predominance sufficient 
to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 106  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1439 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Third Amended Class Action Complaint of the Sherman Antitrust Act at 2 
Behrend v. Comcast 264 F.R.D. 150 (2010) (arguing that because Comcast 
clusters the market it possess the requisite monopoly power over the region 
and can charge supracompetitive prices because of the limited availability of 
other cable companies available to customers in the region). 
 107  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1439 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting).  Dr. 
McClave used a “but-for” model suggesting what prices would have looked 
like “but-for” Comcast’s alleged antitrust actions. See Rossi v. Standard Roof-
ing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 485 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating “using a ‘but for’ damage 
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leged behavior, consumers in the affected market were paying 
over 13% more for their subscription services.108 While the model 
was the point of contention for Comcast and basis for the majori-
ty’s decision, the dissent adamantly argued that it was suffi-
cient.109 
The minority examined the issue of admissibility with re-
gards to the contested damage model offered by the plaintiffs.110 
The purpose of the model was to demonstrate that Comcast’s an-
titrust behaviors led Comcast subscribers to pay higher prices 
than if there had been competitors in the Philadelphia region.111 
The model was not used to determine damages, but rather to 
prove liability.112 Therefore, the dissent did not believe that the 
district court abused its discretion in finding that the model 
could, in theory, determine damages suffered by the class even 
though the model included all theories of liability, not just the 
successful theory.113 The dissenting justices stated that it could be 
used to measure damages for the accepted overbuilder theory, in 
large part, because Comcast argued that the other theories, which 
were not accepted by the lower courts, did not impact prices.114 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer further argued that, if Comcast’s 
contention was correct, then the model could accurately depict 
the difference in price due to the overbuilding theory.115 In es-
sence, the dissent believed the model served enough of a purpose 
                                                          
model arguably makes it impossible for the trier of fact to determine what, if 
any, injury derived from the defendant’s antitrust violations as opposed to 
other factors and courts sometimes reject such models as the basis of either 
causation or amount of injury.”). 
 108  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1439 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 109  Id.; See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 589 n. 5 (1996) (Scalia 
J., dissenting) (emphasizing the typical rule is that the Supreme Court will not 
review findings of fact by the lower courts when they agree except in extraor-
dinary circumstances where there is clearly an error). 
 110  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1439 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting); See 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, 181, 186–88 
(Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed.2000) (noting that expert’s choices are crucial 
when creating the regression model, the model must be correctly established, 
including properly choosing the variables, in order for results to be valid). 
 111   Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1439 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 112  Id. at 1441.  The dissent adamantly argued  “Dr. McClave’s model 
does not purport to show how Comcast’s conduct led to higher prices in the 
Philadelphia area. It simply shows that Comcast’s conduct brought about 
higher prices. And it measures the amount of subsequent harm.” 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id. 
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to affirm the lower courts certification of the class.116 
IV.   ANALYSIS OF - COMCAST V. BEHREND 
A.  Majority’s Analysis 
Justice Scalia in the majority opinion stated that Comcast 
is “a straightforward application of certification principles.”117 
The majority appears to have made the stronger argument espe-
cially under the understanding that class action suits are without 
a doubt evolving in the legal arena.118 As Part I suggests, class ac-
tions have developed since Rule 23 was first established in 
1966.119 The majority had the opportunity to answer the question 
of whether Daubert needed to be applied in the “rigorous analy-
sis” standard employed by the lower courts prior to class certifica-
tion.120 As the minority addressed, the lack of a Daubert discus-
sion by the majority in Comcast was likely the consequence of 
Comcast never raising an issue about Dr. McClave’s model early 
on and therefore waiving its right to object.121 
While the Court may have missed an opportunity to pro-
vide clarity about the scope or application of a Daubert analysis 
in class action suits, it reemphasized important procedural as-
pects of class actions.122 The Court emphasized that a determina-
                                                          
 116  Id. 
 117  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433; See also Bone, Misguided supra note 9 at 
44 (noting that “[t] he Court purported to simply apply the ‘rigorous analysis’ 
standard of proof for certification that Wal-Mart endorsed, which includes a 
serious merits review.”). 
 118  Allen, supra note 6; See Linda S. Mullenix, Putting Proponents to 
Their Proof: Evidentiary Rules at Class Certification, 6 (The University of 
Texas School of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 
416 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2276088 [hereinafter Mullenix, 
Proponents] (acknowledging the evolution of class actions, specifically in the 
last two decades where there the “rigorous standard” analysis is increasingly 
being applied by all levels of the federal courts). 
 119  Allen, supra note 6. 
 120  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 12. 
 121  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 122  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118 at 12; See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 
1432 (explaining that Rule 23 is not merely a pleading standard, but rather the 
plaintiffs must not only satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a), but also 
clearly satisfy, through evidentiary proof, a subsection of Rule 23(b)).  Comcast 
took the majority opinion in Wal-Mart a step further and extended its analysis 
regarding 23(a) to 23(b). Therefore, an even closer look is now required to de-
termine if plaintiffs adequately satisfy 23(b). 
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tion of class certification must involve an analysis that delves 
deep into the requirements set forth in Rule 23.123 This further re-
iterates the movement away from an Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquel-
in standard where class certification did not involve any analysis 
into the merits of the case.124  The recent trend has been towards 
applying a Daubert analysis, even without explicitly referring to 
it as that, when analyzing and evaluating the weight of expert 
testimony.125 This is because if expert testimony were simply ac-
cepted on its face, virtually all classes would be certified.126 
In 2003, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules removed 
the provision permitting conditional class certification, which 
suggests an even greater importance placed on conducting a deep 
analysis prior to class certification.127  While judges still have the 
discretion to reassess certification at a later stage, often times this 
is no longer practiced.128 This further emphasizes that when a 
class is certified it should not be a light or conditional decision.129 
                                                          
 123   Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118 at 12; See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147 
(emphasizing that it is sometimes necessary to delve beyond the pleadings in 
order to determine if the Rule 23 prerequisites to certification are satisfied, and 
certification is proper only in the event that a district court completes a rigor-
ous analysis prior to certification). 
 124  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 12; See also Eisen, 417 U.S. at 
177 (holding that that “nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 . . . 
gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of 
a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action”). 
 125  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 24; See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 
2553–54 (noting that the Court disagreed with the district court’s finding that 
Daubert did not apply to expert testimony prior to certification). 
 126  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 24; See Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 
1433 (quoting Behrend, 655 F.3d at 206 holding the court of appeals simply 
concluded that respondents “provided a method to measure and quantify 
damages on a class-wide basis,” finding it unnecessary to decide “whether the 
methodology [was] a just and reasonable inference or speculative.”).  If the bar 
were lowered for class certification then very large classes may be certified 
even though there may be multiple issues present. This would prove to be 
problematic for both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs may not have their 
issues fully represented, and defendants would face difficulties addressing all 
the various issues in one case. 
 127  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 25; See Wright, Miller & 
Cooper 7AA FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1785.4 (describing 
decertification of prior certification orders). 
 128  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 25. 
 129   Id.; See also In re Constart Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 780 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quoting Newton, 259 F.3d at 162) (“[c]lass certification is an espe-
cially serious decision, as it ‘is often the defining moment in class actions (for it 
may south the “death knell” of litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or create un-
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The issue for the majority, as the dissent addressed, is that 
Comcast never brought up specific objections to the plaintiff’s 
proffered expert testimony until later in the lawsuit.130 The tough 
questions regarding admissibility and reliability of the evidence 
should have been addressed before the class was certified. As the 
majority correctly asserted, because the lower courts simply certi-
fied the class without undertaking a more in-depth look at the 
expert testimony, it was unclear if certification was proper.131 Be-
cause appellate courts often give great deference to a trial court’s 
certification of the class, the original determination of proper cer-
tification must not be handed down lightly.132  Therefore, while 
the majority’s holding in Comcast provides further clarification 
for the requirements of Rule 23(b), it does not fully address the 
deference that must be awarded to expert testimony in determin-
ing if the evidence meets the requisite standards. 
B.  Dissent’s Analysis 
While the dissent did not believe that Comcast sets forth 
any future standards, which it certainly does, it did present many 
strong arguments that must be acknowledged.  Justices Ginsburg 
and Breyer argued that this decision did not create any new black 
letter law, but they failed to acknowledge that the holding clari-
fies for lower courts and future class action suits the strict re-
quirement of a rigorous analysis.133 When the Supreme Court de-
                                                          
warranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the part of the defend-
ants). 
 130  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435–36 (Ginsburg J. dissenting). 
As it turns out, our reformulated question was inapt. To preserve a claim of 
error in the admission of evidence, a party must timely object to or move to 
strike the evidence . . . Comcast did not object to the admission of Dr. 
McClave’s damages model under Rule 702 or Daubert Consequently, Comcast 
forfeited any objection to the admission of Dr. McClave’s model at the certifi-
cation stage. At this late date, Comcast may no long argue that respondents’ 
damages evidence was inadmissible. 
 131  Id. at 1434–35.  The majority asserts that the lower court, where certi-
fication was deemed proper, did not employ the necessary level of scrutiny. 
 132  See, e.g., Behrend, 655 F.3d at 189 (citing Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 
at 312) (reinforcing the importance of class certification for both plaintiffs and 
defendants). 
 133  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1437 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting); See 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316 (holding that the requirements of Rule 23 
do not only apply to the pleadings, but also often “overlap between a class cer-
tification requirement and the merits of a claim”, but a rigorous analysis is still 
necessary). 
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cided the decertification of the class they noted that the predomi-
nance requirement set forth in this rule was a “demanding” one.134  
While the dissent emphasized the dictum offered in Amchem, its 
argument is not as strong as the majority’s because Amchem also 
reinforced the principles of the “rigorous analysis” required by 
Falcon.135 
The dissent, or at minimum Justice Kagan, seemed to sug-
gest that the current bench cannot find a class action suit it finds 
compelling.136 While the rigor of class certification has increased 
over time, there is a concern that overly strict standards will re-
move the only vehicle for litigation plaintiffs may possess.137 Giv-
en that this may be the only option, plaintiffs would logically 
want a certain level of judicial scrutiny placed on the evidentiary 
record.138 This would in turn prevent large corporate defendants 
from including inadmissible evidence, which would obliterate the 
possibility for class certification.139 Thus, while certain justices 
might be concerned with the trend that class actions appear to be 
taking in the 21st century, it seems that there are advantages not 
only for class action defendants, but also for the potential class 
plaintiffs.140 
However, the concern regarding access to justice for these 
plaintiffs is not without merit.141 At the same time, despite the 
clarification and rigorous analyses now being employed during 
class action certification, litigants continue to pursue this type of 
                                                          
 134  Klonoff, Antitrust supra note 40, at 4 (quoting Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 
2312). 
 135  Id. 
 136  Hurley, supra note 2. 
 137  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 17 stating “[d]efendants should 
recognize and concede that a denial of class certification in some types of cases 
may indeed leave many plaintiffs without effective representation.” 
 138  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 21; See Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676 
(noting that once a class is certified in the district court, in most circumstances 
this is the final word on the subject). 
 139  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 21. 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. at 28; See Whirlpool, 678 F.3d at 421 (explaining that the cost of lit-
igation is a large enough deterrent for individuals contemplating pursuing an 
alternate litigation route than class action); See also Suzette M. Malveaux, 
How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal- Mart, 106 NW. 
U. L. REV. Colloquy 34, 37 (2011) (explaining how when individuals with 
small claims are often deterred from challenging large corporations or other 
employers because of the many procedural hurled and how this “effectively 
immuniz[es] companies from complying with the law.”). 
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action.142 While advocates of class actions make strong arguments 
that increased rigor is now being employed in class determina-
tions, there is often a failure to accept that this additional rigor is 
fostering a more just system.143 
C.  Congressional Intervention to Clarify Rule 23 and its 
Evolving Interpretations 
Some scholars suggest that the Court may not be the most 
effective mechanism for clarifying the requirements of Rule 23.144  
One suggestion included the recommendation that Congress en-
act an amendment that would provide judges the opportunity to 
use discretion when determining whether class actions would be 
the best way to remedy the issue at hand.145 However, this ap-
proach seems problematic because it would cause likely a lack of 
consistency throughout the law based on jurisdiction or even 
based on judge. Without clarification regarding how deep the ev-
idence must be examined, there is opportunity on both sides for 
parties to provide inadmissible evidence as support for why class 
certification is or is not proper.146 In the event Congress would 
not want to add an additional amendment, but may wish to pro-
vide further clarification than what the courts have offered, there 
is opportunity for additional Advisory Committee Notes.147 
The options for further clarification are not limited to re-
vising the Rules of Civil Procedure, but may also include editing 
the Manual for Complex Litigation.148 This text is a judicial 
handbook published by the Federal Judicial Center, which offers 
insight into how the judiciary should best manage complex litiga-
                                                          
 142  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 29. 
 143  See Id. (suggesting “[w]hat the past twenty years teaches is that the 
class certification process has become better, not worse, and has improved the 
quality of lawyering and judicial decision-making.”); See also Robert Bone & 
David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 
1251, 1305 (explaining that “an erroneous denial of certification does not neces-
sarily doom the class action completely . . . the named plaintiffs, if they contin-
ue with individual suits, might be able to obtain later reconsideration of a neg-
ative certification decision when more information is available”). 
 144  Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 13. 
 145  See Proposed Rules: Amendments to Federal Rules, 167 F.R.D. 523, 
559 (1996) (proposed Rule 23(b)(3)(F)). 
 146  Mullenix, supra note 118, at 16. 
 147  Id. at 17. 
 148  Id. at 32. 
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tion.149 Federal judges who seek clarification on certain litigation 
matters often look to this handbook for guidance.150 In its current 
form, the Manual does not provide insight into the evidentiary 
standard that must be observed at the time of class certifica-
tion.151 Therefore, one suggestion is for this text to be revised to 
provide further insight, if the Court wishes to avoid drastically 
altering black letter law.152 
Because the majority in Comcast at least somewhat dove 
into the admissibility standards, it was not—as the minority be-
lieved—a case that will be irrelevant in future matters. Since the 
Supreme Court in Comcast reiterated to lower courts that there 
must be meaningful scrutiny especially in terms of Rule 23(b), 
further guidance is offered into the standards that must be met 
for certification to be proper.153 By clarifying the need for judicial 
scrutiny, this decision greatly impacts the future of class actions 
and prevents the abuse from plaintiff attorneys asserting that 
class action is the only option, when individual suits may very 
likely suffice.154 
V.  IMPACT 
Undoubtedly, the main consequence of this case is an in-
creased burden on potential class action plaintiffs and an in-
creased difficulty for class actions to survive judicial review, in 
large part, because the holding places a higher burden on con-
sumers to prove that injury exists before damages can be properly 
                                                          
 149   See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004) 
(offering federal judges guidance on best practices for various litigation mat-
ters, including class actions). 
 150  Mullenix, supra note 118, at 32; See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (FOURTH) §23.25  (2004) (providing that Rule 702 and Daubert 
have “always required that expert testimony ‘assist the trier of fact’ to under-
stand evidence or resolve issues in the case”). 
 151  Mullenix, supra note 118, at 32; See also Joanna C. Schwartz, Gate-
ways and Pathways in Civil Procedure, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1652, 1685 (2013) 
(explaining the extent in which the Manuel For Complex Litigation offers 
guidance for litigating class actions). 
 152  Mullenix, supra note 118, at 32 (stating “[r]evising. . .to include. . . a 
specific evidentiary requirement has the virtue of providing federal judges 
with an authoritative source upon which to rely in determining on how to 
properly evaluate class certification motions.”). 
 153  Id. at 17. 
 154 Id. 
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awarded.155 Consumers must provide admissible evidence dis-
playing eligibility, on a class-wide basis, for damages at the certi-
fication stage before the case may move forward.156 
The most practical impact stemming from the holding in 
this case is that Rule 23(b)(3) now requires a much more rigorous 
analysis, which would need to occur when determining liability, 
causation, and damages.157 While the rule does not require dam-
ages to be exact, damages need to be consistent with the liability 
theory.158 Plaintiffs must demonstrate that damages can be estab-
lished on a class-wide basis, but defendants can usurp the classi-
fication of a class if they can prove individual damages.159 In 
practical effect, this likely means that class certification may oc-
cur later in the legal process than in past cases.160 Practically 
speaking, this will likely be beneficial for the plaintiff class be-
cause it will allow them more time to prepare discovery and solid-
ify their argument, ensuring that class certification is proper.161 
Ultimately, this will increase their chances for recovery.162 De-
fendants should also now be aware of the importance of making 
an argument for a Daubert analysis early on in the proceedings. 
This case further emphasizes that expert evidence may not 
be sufficient if it does not tie the accepted legal theory behind the 
suit to the calculation of damages. This seems to create an even 
greater burden on plaintiffs who, as in Comcast, allege multiple 
theories of liability. Hypothetically, experts then would be re-
quired to calculate damages for each individual theory and the 
various combinations of theories; thus, if the district court had 
held that two of the four proposed theories of antitrust behavior 
were supported, then the damage model would have to include 
solely those two accepted theories. 
                                                          
 155  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Shepard Goldfein & James Keyte, ‘Comcast Corp. v. Behrend’: Yet 
More Rigor for Certifying Class Actions, 249 N.Y. L. J. No. 97 (May 21, 2013). 
 158  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435. 
 159 Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 140 (stating “[t]here are some situations where 
courts have determined that a case is not manageable as a class action because 
of the necessity for individualized damages determinations.”). 
 160  Allen, supra note 6. 
 161  Id. 
 162  Id. 
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A.  Supreme Court Cases in the Wake of Comcast: Additional 
Roadblocks Implemented by the Roberts Court to Class 
Actions 
Comcast is not the only class action dispute that received 
much attention.163 Out of the seven class action related cases re-
cently heard by the Court, only one decision was in favor of the 
plaintiff class.164 This recent trend places a greater burden on 
consumers who now have to demonstrate their compliance with 
Rule 23 in a greater way. While at face value, some may argue 
that this is detrimental to consumers in general, there may be 
deeper benefits. The Comcast holding ensures that class action 
suits with the most merit will be heard as opposed to cases where 
a class is improperly certified in the first instance. 
The final case the Supreme Court heard on class actions 
this term was American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 
which resulted in another strong dissent that alleged the current 
make up of the bench would greatly diminish the future of class 
action suits.165  The majority held that the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“Act”) does not permit the judiciary to nullify an arbitration 
agreement that contains a contractual waiver preventing class ac-
tions simply because the cost of individual litigation or arbitra-
tion would exceed the recovery.166 This suit began as a dispute 
                                                          
 163  The seven cases include: Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426, Amgen, Inc. v. 
Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), Standard Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013), Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 
133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013), Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 
(2013), Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013) and American Express, 133 
S. Ct  2304. 
 164  Hurley, supra note 2 (discussing Amgen which was the only business 
defendant this past term which lost in class action case, but many argue that 
this was extremely limited in application); See generally Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. 
Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1384 (2012). 
 165  American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan,, J., dissenting). 
 166  Id. at 2312; See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” 
Artbitration Clauses?: The Use of Arbitration Clauses after Concepcion, 13 
(August 15, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2306268 (asserting that 
the court had in large part decided in favor of enforcing the arbitration agree-
ment because there was no Congressional intervention requiring the court to 
reject arbitration agreement); See also id. at 14 n. 73 (suggesting “Congress 
might enact legislation restricting the enforceability of arbitral class waivers, 
although the prospects of any statutory change are slight. In addition, the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau has authority to regulate arbitration claus-
es in consumer financial services contracts under Section 1028(b) of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, after it completes its 
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about an arbitration clause’s waiver of class action suits between 
petitioners, American Express, and respondents, who were mer-
chants that accept American Express credit cards as payment.167 
The respondents, as in Comcast, alleged a violation of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act and a violation of the Clayton Act.168 Howev-
er, per the terms of the arbitration agreement, to fight American 
Express on the alleged violation would be a foolish undertaking 
due to the many procedural bars set forth in the agreement.169 
American Express involved a question of legality regarding an 
arbitration clause in a contract with American Express that pre-
vents any opportunity to resolve the dispute.170 The Court at-
tempted to answer how the Act affects arbitration clauses and the 
effect on consumers or small businesses that conduct business 
with large corporations.171 These arbitration agreements prevent 
class actions from forming.172 This decision in large part affirmed 
the Court’s previous ruling in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion that 
held that arbitration agreements could prevent consumers from 
forming classes for suit under state law.173 The general principle 
of the Act is that arbitration agreements, regardless of antitrust 
claims, are contractual and therefore, must be rigorously en-
                                                          
statutorily mandated study. See 12 U.S.C. 5518(b) (offering a vehicle to restrict 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration). 
 167  American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2304. 
 168  American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2306; See also Brief for Respondents at 
5–6 American Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-
133) (providing details of the plaintiffs claims against American Express). 
 169  American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 170  Id. at 2307; See also 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 2:14 (9th ed.) 
(discussing the common law contract defense of unconscionability may be used 
as a tool to overcome certain provisions that may prevent an opportunity to 
litigate). 
 171  American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2307. 
 172  See generally CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) 
(reiterating that the Federal Arbitration Act mandates courts to enforce arbi-
tration agreements in all circumstances except when there is exists congres-
sional intent suggesting otherwise); but see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (noting that nothing in the 
Sherman Act suggests that Congress had the intention of preventing a waiver 
of class-action procedure). 
 173  AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) involved a class 
of consumers who alleged that ATT fraudulently advertised free cellphones for 
individuals who sign up for cellphone service and contract. However, the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act preempted the law in California (the state in controversy) 
law, which held that arbitration agreements are unenforceable if they prevent 
consumers from forming a class. 
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forced.174 
In support of their motion, petitioners offered evidence 
that demonstrated the cost of obtaining expert evidence that 
would be necessary to prove the existence of support for antitrust 
allegations.175 The petitioners’ expert witness, an economist, not-
ed that for an individual trying to prove his or her contention, the 
cost would be at least several hundred thousand dollars with the 
possibility of an even greater cost.176 This is important in light of 
the majority’s rationale in Comcast, which forces plaintiffs to 
match theories of liability with provable damages.177 Thus, in the 
event that multiple consumers can come together to form a class, 
the cost for expert analysis in support of their contentions would 
be even more costly which alone, may constitute a great enough 
deterrent for many who feel intimidated to go up against large 
corporations, primarily because of financial reasons. Although the 
Court of Appeals held that the waiver was unenforceable because 
of its deterring effects, the Supreme Court held that the subject 
arbitration agreement must be treated as a contract and thus was 
enforceable.178 
As in Comcast, this case led to a strong split in the bench 
and another heated dissent.179 Justice Kagan led this charge and 
stated that the current conservative majority will likely never 
find a class action that it finds acceptable.180 The dissent present-
ed a valid opinion that the arbitration agreement, due to the 
many procedural bars it required, insulated American Express 
from any liability stemming from potential antitrust behaviors, 
and leaves merchants who accept this type of credit card with 
limited recourse.181 
Does American Express burden the consumer even more 
                                                          
 174  9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West). 
 175  American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2307. 
 176   Id. at 2308; but cf. Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 
U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (stating that Court may decline to enforce an arbitration 
agreement if costs of arbitration are so high that they preclude individuals 
from asserting their rights under the agreement). 
 177  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
 178  American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2312; See Rodriguez v. United States, 
480 U.S. 52, 525–26 (1987) (noting that antitrust laws do not guarantee that a 
path to remedy will be affordable for all potential plaintiffs). 
 179  American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 180  Id. at 2320 (Kagan J., dissenting). 
 181  Id. at 2312 (Kagan J. Dissenting) (arguing that this decision bypasses 
years of precedent that aim to prevent arbitration clauses from preventing con-
sumers from having any mechanisms for remedy or redress). 
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than the strict requirements set forth in Comcast? It would ap-
pear so. It has been suggested that congressional interference 
would help clarify, specifically in antitrust disputes the relation-
ship between the Federal Arbitration Act and the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.182 The worry expressed by a passionate Justice Kagan, 
was that the Federal Arbitration Act had the potential to insulate 
corporations or large entities from any liability, because of the 
limitations prescribed by the arbitration clause.183 However, the 
majority held that, given the absence of any clarification or inter-
vention by Congress, contract law must govern.184  While the 
Federal Arbitration Act dictated in this case, American Express 
creates yet another impediment to the future of class action suits. 
B.  The Uncertain Future of the Role of a Daubert Analysis in 
Class Actions 
While Comcast may provide clarity in the strict interpreta-
tion of Rule 23 and the importance of a “rigorous analysis” at the 
class certification stage, not all issues have been resolved.185 
When the case reached the court of appeals, the question for the 
judges pertained to the applicability of the Daubert analysis in 
class action cases.186 Under the Daubert analysis, it is the respon-
sibility of the judge at the trial level to determine that evidence, 
including expert testimony, offered by both sides is relevant and 
reliable.187 The Supreme Court has applied this rule to expert tes-
                                                          
 182  Philip Bump, The Problem with the Supreme Court’s AmEx Decision, 
Class Action, and You, THE ATLANTIC WIRE (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.thewire.com/national/2013/06/supreme-court-american-express-
italian-colors/66443/.  Because both the Federal Arbitration Act and the Sher-
man Antitrust Act are federal statutes, neither can override each other.  See 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (describing that preemption only applies where a 
federal law and a state law conflict, but there is no statutory basis suggesting 
the solution when two federal laws conflict). 
 183  Bump, supra note 182 (quoting Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in Com-
cast, “the monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract ef-
fectively depriving its victim of all recourse.”). 
 184  Id. 
 185  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
 186   Behrend, 655 F.3d at 216; See Goldfein, supra note 157 (discussing to 
what extent Daubert applies to the examination of expert testimony in class 
certification). 
 187  Klonoff, Antitrust, supra note 40, at 17 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 507 U.S. 579 (1993)) (noting, “the trial judge must en-
sure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only rele-
vant, but reliable.”). 
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timony in the examination of principles, methodology, and con-
clusions.188  Because Daubert was not a class action dispute, there 
has been some uncertainty on the application of the standard in 
class actions.189 Early Supreme Court cases, including Eisen, nev-
er performed a Daubert analysis because courts at that time were 
often hesitant to delve into the merits of the case at the certifica-
tion stage.190 However, the shift to a deeper analysis is evident by 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.191 
Some suggested that the Supreme Court in Comcast would 
determine whether Daubert needs to be raised as a challenge by 
the defendants or if it even has a place in the class certification 
process.192  When the Supreme Court granted certiorari it refor-
mulated the question, to determine if the expert’s model needed 
to be admissible under the Daubert analysis for the purposes of 
proper class certification.193 However, the Daubert analysis was 
never fully raised by Comcast in the lower courts despite the bur-
den being placed on the defendants to raise this issue at trial.194 
                                                          
 188  Klonoff, Antitrust, supra note 40, at 17.  However, the author suggests 
that lower courts have often refused to apply Daubert at the certification level 
in class action antitrust suits. This stems from the belief that only a prelimi-
nary inquiry is necessary at the certification stage. See, e.g., In re Polypropyl-
ene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 18, 26 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that 
deciding the admissibility of expert testimony under the Daubert standard is 
not necessary at the class certification stage).  However, this sentiment is 
evolving after Comcast. 
 189  Mullenix, Proponents, supra note 118, at 24 (noting that in recent years, 
even without an explicit Daubert rule in regards to class actions, courts have 
begun to delve more into the essence of both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ expert 
testimony offered, in large part because blindly accepting a plaintiff’s expert 
testimony would result in certification for virtually every class before the 
court). 
 190  See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177 (holding that the language in Rule 23 does 
not suggest that the court has authority to conduct an inquiry into the merits of 
the suit at the class certification of stage). 
 191  See Campbell, supra note 21, at 472–73 (noting that Wal-Mart estab-
lished a heightened standard for what qualifies as a “common question”, and 
due to this, the future of successful nationwide or regional discrimination class 
actions appears bleak). 
 192  Gordon, supra note 189, at 2. 
 193  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer J., dissenting); See 
Campos, supra note 86 (explaining how the original question was altered by 
the Court and how this impacted its decision). 
 194  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting); See 
Gordon, supra note 189, at 2 (noting that Comcast was a perfect opportunity 
for the Supreme Court to resolve the role of Daubert at the certification stage, 
but the Supreme Court had valid reason to not fully address it because Com-
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Typically, when an objection is made in respect to a Daubert 
analysis, the court conducts an inquiry regarding the class certifi-
cation on the testimony presented.195 Instead, the Comcast majori-
ty focused on the degree of rigorousness required under 23(b)(3) 
inquiries.196 Thus, while the Court had the opportunity to provide 
a clear rule for the role of Daubert, it did not do so and that de-
termination will need to be made in a future case. 
C.  Difficulties of Interpretation of Comcast in the Lower Courts 
While the dissenters in Comcast correctly asserted that the 
case does not create new black letter law,197 they failed to 
acknowledge the implications this may have on future class ac-
tion cases at the certification stage.198 The Seventh Circuit has 
heard numerous class action suits since the opinion in Comcast 
was decided.199  The issue of common questions versus common 
answers was apparent in the subsequent case RBS Citizens v. 
Ross, which was a smaller class action suit involving allegations 
of violations of Illinois’ overtime laws.200 The Seventh Circuit 
upheld the certification of class, where the employer, RBS, con-
tended that the plaintiff failed to identify a common issue because 
of the many individual liability inquiries that were present.201  
The court held that this class was comprised of only about 2,000 
                                                          
cast failed to raise the issue early in the case). 
 195  Klonoff, Antitrust, supra note 40, at 18; See Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 
132, n. 4 (explaining that “Daubert requires an inquiry distinct from that for 
evaluating expert evidence in support of a motion for class certification.”). 
 196  Goldfein, supra note 157; but see Campbell, supra note 21 (suggesting 
that Comcast implies that courts should now “engage in Daubert analysis and 
rigorous second-guessing of the plaintiffs’ claims, rather than simply consider-
ing whether, if the evidence is persuasive to the jury, the plaintiffs could prove 
their case.”). 
 197  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 198  See Bone, Misguided, supra note 9, at 50 (theorizing that the holding in 
Comcast will make issue classifying more difficult because it requires not only 
a common question of fact or law, but also common damages). 
 199  Hurley, supra note 2. 
 200 Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013).  Current and former bank 
employees filed the case alleging that the RBS Citizens denied them overtime 
pay in violation of both the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Mini-
mum Wage Law (IMWL).  For the IMWL claim, the district court certified 
two classes, one for hourly workers and one for Assistant Branch Manager 
employees. 
 201  Dinkoff, supra note 89. 
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individuals and the type of evidence necessary to offer was easily 
distinguished.202 The United States Supreme Court granted the 
motion to vacate and remand, signaling that the decision in Com-
cast will not be treated lightly.203 This further denotes that not on-
ly must plaintiffs establish, during the certification stage, that 
damages may be calculated on a class-wide basis, but further 
again emphasizes the importance of common answers to causa-
tion and damages at the trial level. 
Another class action dispute, Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., arose out of the Seventh Circuit.204 Judge Posner wrote the 
opinion, which overturned the district court’s holding, and grant-
ed certification of the class.205 While the lower court disagreed, 
plaintiffs alleged that they met their burden of proving the re-
quirements of certification were satisfied.206  Judge Posner in his 
opinion held that the class should be certified as a matter of judi-
cial efficiency.207  This conflicts with the holding in Comcast, be-
cause not all of the plaintiffs suffered the alleged problem disput-
                                                          
 202  Id. 
 203  See RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ross, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013) (holding that the 
judgment is vacated and remanded back to the seventh circuit given the deci-
sion in Comcast); See also Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 2013 WL 1316452 
(N.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding in light of Comcast the request for certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3) is denied in a wage and hour case because plaintiffs did not suc-
cessfully demonstrate that damages could be calculated on a class wide basis). 
 204  Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2768, and judgment reinstated, 2013 WL 
4478200 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2013).  This case involved a consumer class action 
against a retailer of washing machines alleging problems of mold and a defect 
causing washing machines to suddenly stop. 
 205  Butler, 702 F.3d at 364; See Whirlpool Corp., 678 F.3d at 421(holding, 
in a factually similar case, that both the elements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) 
were satisfied). 
 206  Butler, 702 F.3d at 361.  This case involved two separate suits. There 
were two classes of individuals, one that suffered from a mold claim and an-
other that suffered from a defect causing the machine to stop.  The district 
court denied certification to the class who complained of the mold problem 
and certified the class with the defect in the control unit.  Plaintiffs for the 
mold claim put forth evidence to support certification under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
court determined that this evidence was sufficient in reversing the district 
court’s denial of certification. 
 207  Butler, 702 F.3d at 364; See also Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 
F.3d 402, 410 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[i] t is important to remember that 
the class action device exists primarily, if not solely, to achieve a measure of 
judicial economy, which benefits the parties as well as the entire judicial sys-
tem.”). 
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ed.208  The petition for certiorari raised two questions: specifically 
(1) whether Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement could be 
met on the grounds that it would be more judicially efficient to 
try the single common question as opposed to also considering the 
individual differences and varying issues of the individual class 
members; and (2) whether a class can be certified even though a 
majority of the members did not experience the dispute at issue.209 
The petition to the Supreme Court was granted, vacated 
and remanded for further consideration given the decision in 
Comcast.210  While it appears that Judge Posner would likely 
agree with the dissent in Comcast, the holding appears to be rein-
forced and unchanging.211 This further suggests the Supreme 
Court is adamant on the application of Comcast in subsequent 
cases and that judicial efficiency is not simply a way to usurp the 
ruling. 
In the wake of these cases, it appears that there is still 
some confusion in lower courts how to apply the standards clari-
fied and set forth in Comcast.212 This sentiment was addressed in 
Jacob v. Duane Reed, Inc., which was a class action dispute 
heard in the Southern District of New York.213  The Judge in Ja-
cob noted that lower courts are struggling to determine the scope 
of the Comcast holding.214 He noted that there are three categories 
of decisions that are emerging post–Comcast: (1) courts differenti-
                                                          
 208  The suit included over twenty-seven different types of front-loading 
washers.  Further, the plaintiffs included individuals who do not actually suf-
fer from any mold problem in their washer. 
 209  See generally Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 133 S. Ct. 2768 (2013) 
(granting certiorari in light of the decision in Comcast). 
 210  Butler, 133 S. Ct. at 2768.  However, upon remand Judge Posner again 
held that the case was properly certified despite the holding in Comcast.  But-
ler, 727 F.3d at 799. 
 211   This is evident in the Supreme Court’s recent grants of certiorari, 
which vacated the decisions of the lower courts and remanded for further pro-
ceedings.  See Butler, 133 S. Ct. at 2768, and Whirlpool Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 
1722. 
 212  See generally Jacob v. Duane Reade Inc., 289 F.R.D. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 
March 20, 2013).  But see generally Jacob v. Duane Reade Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying certification for both the damages and liability 
claims).  On reconsideration in light of Comcast, the court held that issue of 
damages could not be resolved on a class-wide basis.  The court certified the 
class solely on the issue of liability, as damages would need to be calculated 
through the use of individualized proof, which would prevent the class from 
meeting the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3).  Id. at 595. 
 213  Jacob, 293 F.R.D. at 581. 
 214  Id. 
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ating the fact pattern from the facts found in Comcast and sug-
gesting a common formula to meet the predominance standard; 
(2) courts noting that there is no common formula present for the 
calculation of damages and thus applying Comcast; and (3) courts 
somewhat applying the standard set forth in Comcast and using 
Rule 23(c)(4) to employ only a liability standard as opposed to al-
so calculating damages in the same stage.215 
Although Comcast does not explicitly provide guidance re-
garding Rule 23(c)(4), in light of the holding the Supreme Court 
recently vacated and remanded a case similarly to Butler in 
Whirlpool Corp., v. Glazer.216 In Whirlpool, the Sixth Circuit em-
phasized that the question of liability should be tried as a class 
action and the issue of damages may be treated individually at a 
later time.217 Besides separating the issue of liability and damag-
es, the Sixth Circuit suggested separating the class into small sub-
classes for determining damages.218 This approach did not come 
up during the discussion of Comcast, but may have been an alter-
native for the plaintiffs to address in the event that they reworked 
the damage model accounting for the one successful liability theo-
ry and the various counties involved. 
The lower courts appear to be grappling with cases that 
involve only liability issues and how Comcast would apply in 
those scenarios.219 It appears then that Comcast will most often be 
applied and followed in cases where liability and damages are in 
dispute, with an emphasis placed on the fact that the theory of li-
ability is tied to the theory on damages.220 Thus, an inquiry into 
the relationship between damages and theories of liability is pru-
dent prior to consideration of certification.221 
                                                          
 215  Id. 
 216  Jacob, 293 F.R.D. at 593; See Whirlpool Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1722 (hold-
ing that in light of Comcast the decision needed to be remanded back to the 
sixth circuit to be reassessed). 
 217  Whirlpool Corp., 678 F.3d at 421. 
 218  Id. 
 219  Jacob, 293 F.R.D. at 587 (citing to Whirlpool II where the Court dis-
tinguishes between cases like Comcast and cases that solely deal with liability 
issues).  In sum, these courts view Comcast’s scope of Comcast to be more lim-
ited especially when damages are not at issue. 
 220  Id. (quoting Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 1435) (“The first step in a damages 
study is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis 
of the economic impact of that event.”). 
 221  Id. at 588. 
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CONCLUSION 
Comcast v. Behrend is an example of the evolution of class 
action and reemphasized the importance of proper certification. 
By ensuring that the lower courts employ a stricter interpretation 
of implementing a rigorous analysis, it ensures proper certifica-
tion. While at first glance the holding appears to place a greater 
burden on consumers, the future does not seem hopeless for po-
tential consumer classes. The case in Comcast could have easily 
been decided the other way if the damage model presented 
matched the accepted theories of liability to their respective dam-
ages. This suggests that while Comcast will undoubtedly have an 
impact on future cases, the applicability may not be as detri-
mental to consumers as commentators have suggested. In reality, 
this holding provides further guidance to potential classes seeking 
certification. The documentation submitted during discovery will 
most likely need to be more in depth than was the case in the 
past. Thus, Comcast will be influential in the future of class ac-
tions to the benefit of both parties. By requiring evidence to be 
scrutinized at a higher standard, consumers are awarded some 
protection from being denied certification based on inadmissible 
evidence. By delving into the merits early on, it helps courts en-
sure that certification is proper. 
While the holding in Comcast will alter the procedure low-
er courts employ in determining class certification, it appears 
there is still some confusion. Lower courts have distinguished lia-
bility cases from lawsuits involving both liability and damages. 
Another potential consequence is the increased use of subclasses 
to assist in determining damages. The use of subclasses was not 
discussed in Comcast, but would have likely altered the majori-
ty’s ruling.  
While the Court had the opportunity to delve into the ap-
plication of a Daubert analysis but failed to thoroughly address it, 
the Court did reinforce the idea that circuit courts can no longer 
refuse to rigorously analyze Rule 23.  However, because the deci-
sion was so recent, and circuits are already finding ways to dis-
tinguish cases, it is unclear just how far the application of Com-
cast will reach. 
 
 
